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MEADE v. DENNISTONE
five years when, in fact, it had not been both voluntary and
continuous for five years. Then, too, the other danger
sought to be avoided by the corroboration rule, i. e., that of
plaintiff's perjury in an effort to obtain a divorce against
the wishes of the defendant is as much present under this
ground as under the misconduct type. 18
The new statutory ground must be considered in connection with the earlier statute of 193114 which legalized separation agreements and provided that the spouses' executing
one should not prevent the obtention of a divorce for
grounds otherwise existent. The earlier statute made it
possible to execute such an agreement without prejudicing
the right to a divorce. The later one further provides that
such an agreement, or any voluntary separation, shall lay
the ground for a divorce itself.

DIRECT RESTRAINTS UPON ALIENATION OF
COVENANT
FEE SIMPLE ESTATES BY
NEGROES
OCCUPANCY
AGAINST
Meade v. Dennistone et al.'
Complainants, as owners of two lots in the 2200 block
on Barclay Street in the City of Baltimore, joined with
fifteen other lot owners in the same block in executing a
written agreement, under which each covenanted for himself, personal representatives, and assigns "that neither
the said respective properties-shall be at any time occupied or used by any Negro or Negroes or person or persons either in whole or in part of Negro or African descent" except as servants. By various conveyances one
of these lots was conveyed to defendant Frank Berman
who contracted to sell the lot to defendant Edward Meade,
a Negro. Pursuant to this contract of sale defendant
Meade entered into possession. Complainants brought suit
in equity for an injunction to enforce this covenant. The
trial court entered a decree enjoining the defendant Meade,
a Negro, from using or occupying the house or from permitting any Negroes or persons of African descent to use
of corroboration, see Note, Need for
23 On one aspect of the requirement
Corroboration of Plaintiff in Suit for Alimony Without Divorce (1937) 1
Md. L. Rev. 266.
14 Md. Code Supp., Art. 16, Sec. 39A.
'

196 At.

330 (Md. 1938).
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or occupy the same. From this decree defendant Meade
appealed. Held: Affirmed.
The defendants contended that this covenant was not
binding and enforceable against them for three reasons:
(1) that its enforcement would be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; (2) that
it is personal and did not run with the land to the defendant Meade for lack of privity of estate; and (3) that it is
a restraint upon alienation and therefore illegal and void.
As to the contention that enforcement of this covenant
would be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
opinion properly held that the constitutional inhibition is
upon the power of the state, and not on the rights of individuals to contract with each other in respect to their property. In Corriganv. Buchley 2 the Supreme Court held that
covenants prohibiting the sale or occupation of private
property by Negroes were not a violation of either the
Fifth, Thirteenth, or Fourteenth Amendments. These
amendments, it is true, apply to the judicial as well as the
legislative department of the state government, but the
state or federal judiciary does not violate these amendments of the Federal Constitution merely because it sanctions discriminations that are the outgrowth of contracts
between individuals.
As to the contention that this covenanant was personal
and did not run with the land to defendant Meade, the
opinion correctly held that in a suit in equity to enforce
a restrictive covenant, privity of estate existing between
the original covenantor and covenantee is not material.
The enforcement of covenants running with the land by an
action at law against an assignee of the covenantor is entirely dependent upon the existence of privity of estate.
At the time this covenant was entered into between these
lot owners, there existed no privity of estate between each
other. No estate or interests in the land of each was conveyed to the others at the time. Each was a stranger
to the legal title of the others. Therefore, for lack of
any privity of estate existing between covenantors and
covenantees at the time of the execution of this covenant,
neither the benefit nor burden of the covenant could attach to the respective lots of each and run to subsequent
assignees in a court of law.3 However, equity has dis2271 U. S. 323, 70 L. Ed. 969, 46 S. Ct. 521 (1926).
3 For a full discussion of the requirement of privity of estate as a basis
for the enforcement of covenants against subsequent assignees in an action at law, see (1937) 1 Md. L. R. 320.
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pensed with the necessity for the existence of privity of
estate between covenantor and covenantee. The benefit
and burden of any contract or covenant entered into between owners of real property will attach and run with
their respective properties in equity against subsequent
assignees with notice, so long as the covenant touches and
concerns their respective properties. Strangers to the
legal title of each may contract with each other, so as to
bind their respective properties with the benefits and burdens of covenants running with the land. Here these lot
owners contracted with each other for the purpose of imposing a restrictive burden on the lot of each with a corresponding benefit on the lots of the others. The agreement expressly stated that it was intended to run with
the land and be binding upon all subsequent owners of
any of the lots. Since the covenant restricted the use and
occupation of the lots, there can be no question as to the
burden not touching and concerning the land, and so, in
equity, subsequent assignees with notice of any of these
lots would be bound by an equitable easement or servitude for the benefit of the other lots.4
The principal question confronting the 'Court in this
case arose from the defendants' third contention that the
covenant in question was a direct restraint upon alienation
of a fee simple estate, and therefore void as against public policy. Restraints upon alienation fall into two classes:
Indirect and direct. Indirect restraints upon alienation
arise by the creation of interests which from their inherent
nature are inalienable. The two principal forms of indirect restraints are the creation of indestructable private
trusts and the creation of contingent future interests. The
policy of the law as evidenced by the Rule against Perpetuities is to permit the creation of these types of indirect restraints, so long as they are not of too long a
duration in the future. On the other hand direct restraints
against alienation are limitations in the creation of possessory estates which restrict or prevent full alienation
of such present possessory estates.
Direct restraints may take one of three different forms.
One form consists of a provision in the creating instrument purporting to deny to the grantee or devisee the
power of alienation over the estate created. If this device is successful, an estate has been created of an inalienI For a full discussion of the enforcement in equity of covenants or contracts as equitable easements and servitudes against subsequent assignees,
see (1.938) 2 Md. L. R. 265.
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able character. Any attempt to alienate the estate is a
nullity and is void. On the other hand the attempted alienation in no way destroys or forfeits the estate. Some authorities describe this type of restraint as a "disabling restraint '"
while others describe it as a "direction against alienation'. As the attempted alienation does not destroy or
forfeit the estate, there remains no right of enforcement
in the original grantor or testator's heirs. The only attack
upon the validity of the alienation must come from either
the alienor or the alienee. If this type of restraint is held
valid, then clearly the property is inalienable for its duration and it has been entirely removed from commerce. This
type of restraint existed in Clark v. Clark7 and Gischell
v. Ballman5
The second type of restraint consists of a forfeiture
provision upon an attempted alienation by the grantee
or devisee. This forfeiture provision may be of one of
three types. It may be a condition subsequent against
alienation with a right of re-entry upon breach left in
the grantor or testator's heirs. Brown v. Hobbs9 involved
this type of restraint. It may be made in the form of a
determinable or special limitation causing an automatic
termination of the estate upon an attempted alienation.
Under this type of restraint there exists a possibility of
reverter in the grantor or testator's heirs. Stansbury v.
Hubner ° contained this type of restraint. Thirdly, it may
be made in the form of an executory interest over to a
third person upon an attempted alienation. Anyone of
these three forms of restraints operates to destroy or forfeit the estate of the grantee upon an attempted alienation.
If restraints against alienation are to be treated as contrary to public policy, it is perfectly apparent that "disabling restraints", discussed in the previous paragraph,
are much more objectionable than forfeiture restraints.
In the case of the former the grantee holds an indestructSee Schnebly, Reatraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests (1935)
44 Yale L. J. 961. This article contains a full and complete analysis of all
the American and English cases dealing with direct restraints on alienation.
Simes, Future Interests Secs. 445-454.
99 Md. 356, 58 Atl. 24 (1904).
131 Md. 260, 101 At. 698 (1917).
132 Md. 559, 104 Atl. 283 (1918).
The provision was worded as follows:
10 73 Md. 228, 20 Atl. 904 (1890).
"So long as they hold and till the same". The opinion describes it as a
condition subsequent but the Restatement of Property Sec. 44, subsection
L. states that such words indicate an automatic termination and not a
forfeiture, and thus must be construed as a determinable or special limitation.
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ible estate which is inalienable, while in the latter the
grantee holds a destructible estate which is destroyed by
an attempted alienation. Therefore, it is always possible
for the owner of the right of re-entry, possibility of reverter, or executory interest to join with the grantee in
alienating the full estate. A "disabling restraint" prevents alienation by any person or group of persons, while
a forfeiture restraint merely prevents alienation by the
grantee himself but permits alienation by the grantee acting jointly with the owner of the right of re-entry, possibility of reverter, or executory interest. Thus, a "disabling restraint" removes the property entirely from commerce while a forfeiture restraint merely places an impediment upon alienation.
The third type of restraint arises where the provision
is worded as a covenant running with the land. It might
be argued that a covenant against alienation creates merely
a contract right, and therefore does not affect the power
of the grantee to alienate, and at most merely acts as a
deterant to alienation because of the resulting liability for
damages for breach of contract. Certainly in an action at
law a covenant against alienation does not operate as a
restraint upon the legal power of alienation. But equity
has developed the doctrine of enforcing covenants running
with the land by injunction irrespective of the adequacy
of the remedy at law." As a result, in equity, a covenant
against alienation becomes an equitable servitude or easement upon the legal estate of the grantee or devisee. If
the alienation can thus be enjoined, then the covenant operates in equity as a "disabling restraint". Thus a naked
covenant against alienation is just as objectionable in removing the property from commerce as the ordinary "disabling restraint". In Real Estate Co. v. Serio2 the restraint was worded as a covenant, and the opinion treats
it as having the same effect as a "disabling restraint".
However, there is one fundamental difference between a
"disabling restraint" and a covenant. In the former since
the attempted alienation does not destroy the estate, there
is no right of enforcement in the grantor or any other
third person. The only attack upon the attempted alienation must come from the alienor or alienee. But in the case
of covenants, the benefit of the covenant either rests in the
grantor in gross or runs with some nearby land, so that
11Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 487 (1870).
"2156 Md. 229, 144 At.

245 (1929).
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a right of enforcement rests in the person who holds the
benefit of the covenant. This fact makes it less objectionable than the ordinary "disabling restraint", since it is
possible for the holder of the benefit of the covenant to
join with the grantee in alienating the estate. Thus, a
covenant operates like a "disabling restraint" by leaving the grantee's estate indestructible by an attempted
alienation, but operates like a forfeiture restraint in giving the grantee the ability to alienate if joined by the
holder of the benefit.
In many cases where the restraint is worded as a covenant, it is accompanied by a condition subsequent with
a right of re-entry left in the grantor or testator's heirs.
In such cases the attempted alienation results in a forfeiture, thereby ending the duration of the covenant. The
presence of the covenant as a restraint is therefore, no
more objectionable than the condition subsequent, and must
8
be treated as a forfeiture restraint. Brown v. Hobbs"
contained a combination of a covenant and condition subsequent against alienation.
In the present case the provision in question is clearly
worded as a covenant running with the land. If construed
to be a restraint against alienation, it cannot be considered of the forfeiture type because of lack of a provision
for forfeiture or termination upon breach. On the other
hand it cannot be construed as a "disabling restraint"
since a right of enforcement was clearly intended to attach
to the other lot owners in the block. The only reasonable construction was as a covenant, the burden of which
ran with the land to the defendant Meade with the benefit running with the land of the complainants.
If the covenant in question can be considered a restraint
against alienation, the problem is presented as to whether
it is void as against public policy when imposed on' a fee
simple estate. The recognized objection to restraints
against alienation is the fact that they remove the property from commerce, and tend toward concentration of
wealth. Another great objection is that they tend to
deter the making of improvements, since the owner will
be reluctant to make improvements if he is unable to realize their value by sale. In discussing these objections a
distinction must be made between these three types of
restraints. Certainly "disabling restraints" entirely remove the property from commerce during their duration,
but forfeiture restraints and covenants merely require the
12 Supra note 9.
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alienation to be joined in by another person or persons.
Thus, these two types are less objectionable than the "disabling restraint". Likewise the forfeiture restraint is
considerably less objectionable than the covenant or "disabling" types when it comes to the objection that they tend
toward the concentration of wealth. In the forfeiture type
the owner of the land cannot live in ease without payment
of his debts, since a creditor always has the power of causing a forfeiture by levying an execution upon the land.
Of course, the execution sale cannot benefit the creditor,
but he will have the satisfaction of destroying his debtor's
estate. On the other hand in the case of the "disabling"
and covenant types, the debtor may live in ease without
payment of his debts with the knowledge that no one can
destroy his estate.
Where the restraint against alienation is imposed upon
a fee simple estate, our Court of Appeals has held the restraint void, whether created by a "disabling restraint",
a covenant, or a forfeiture provision. Clark v. Clark" and
Gischell v. Ballman" involved disabling restraints; Brown
v. Hobbs" and Stansbury v. Hubner17 involved forfeiture
restraints; and Real Estate Co. v. Serio s involved a covenant. In all of these cases the restraints were imposed
upon fee simple estates and were held to be illegal and
void irrespective of the type of restraint. Where the restraints are unqualified as to time the courts have uniformly held void all three types if imposed on a fee simple
estate. However, where the restraint is limited as to time,
a few jurisdictions will uphold the restraint if it is of the
forfeiture type,"9 while none of the courts seem willing to
uphold a restraint limited as to time when it is of the disabling type.
Frequently restraints are qualified as to the alienee.
The covenant in this case if construed as a restraint against
alienation was qualified as to alienee, i. e. persons of African descent. Where the restraint restricts alienation to
a relatively small group, it is certainly as objectionable
as if it were unqualified. This was the situation in Brown
v. Hobbs20 where alienation was restricted to "some person or persons by the name of Brown within the line of
1,Supra

note 7.
15 Supra note 8.
'e Supra note 9.
"Supra note 10.
' Supra note 12.
,1Smes, Future Interests See. 458.
'o Supra note 9.
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consanguinity or blood relation to the said grantor". The
Court of Appeals properly held that to be an illegal restraint against alienation. But where a restraint permits
alienation to everyone except a small class there is less
objection to the restraint. This type principally arises
where the restraint is against persons of a particular race
as in this case. Such restraints usually have the practical
effect of promoting alienability to persons of the non-restricted group by enhancing the value of the land. In
two states, Louisiana21 and Missouri, 22 such restraints when
created by the forfeiture type of restraint have been upheld, while two states, California 23 and Michigan, 24 have
held forfeiture restraints of this type void. Where the restraint is in the form of a covenant as in this case the District of Columbia,2 Kansas, 26 and Colorado 27 have upheld
their validity, while West Virginia 28 has denied their validity.
However, in the case under discussion the covenant
was not worded as a covenant against selling, leasing, or
conveying to persons of African descent, but as a covenant
against ever being "occupied or used" by Negroes. The
opinion carefully points out that this wording makes the
covenant one dealing with the use and occupancy of the
land and not with the legal power to alienate to Negroes.
As such a covenant it does not restrain alienation. This
theory recognizes the right of defendant Berman to alienate
to defendant Meade, a Negro, but denies the latter the
right to occupy his own land. Whether this be a reasonable distinction or not, certainly a covenant against occupancy by persons of African descent will actually restrict alienation as much as one against selling or leasing
to such a class. In drawing this distinction our Court of
29
Appeals was supported by decisions in both California
3
0
and Michigan, both being jutisdictions denying validity
to such restraints when they directly prohibit the sale to
a specified race. 31 . Probably this distinction rests on the
Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazean, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217 (1918).
2" Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919).
Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N. W. 532 (1925).
25 Torrey v. Wolf, 6 Fed. (2nd) 702 (1925) ; Cornish v. O'Donoghue, 30
Fed. (2nd) 893 (1929).
"Clark v. Vaughn, 131 Kan. 438, 292 Pac. 783 (1930).
2 Chander v. Ziegler. 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822 (1930).
2" White v.
White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150 S. E. 531 (1929).
"Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, supra note 23.
"Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N. W. 330 (1922).
'l Supra notes 23 and 24.
21

22 Koehler
1

KIMBLE v. BENDER
feeling that social interests require the toleration of these
restrictions, and therefore the courts have eagerly seized
upon the theoretical difference between a restraint upon
alienation and a restraint upon occupancy to justify their
conclusions.

EFFECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL INELIGIBILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICER UPON HIS OFFICIAL ACTSSTATUS OF PUBLIC OFFICER HOLDING
OFFICE CREATED BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE
Kimble v. Bender'
Defendant had been appointed a justice of the peace at
large for Allegany County pursuant to the provisions of
Chapter 153 of the Acts of 1936. At the time that this
statute was passed, he was a member of the General Assembly as Senator from Allegany County. His eligibility to
hold the office of justice of peace was challenged by mandamus proceedings on the ground, among others, that he
was ineligible to hold the same by virtue of section 17 of
Article 3 of the Maryland Constitution.2 From an order
directing the writ to issue, defendant appealed. Held: Affirmed. Defendant's eligibility was dependent upon whether
the office in question was one created by the Act of 1936.
Prior statutes dealing with the appointment of justices of
the peace in Allegany County were invalid under the holding in Humphrey v. Walls.3 There was in consequence no
valid provision in existence at the time of the passage of
the Act of 1936 for the office to which defendant was appointed, and such office was therefore one created by that
Act, within the meaning of the above provision of the Constitution, although the office of justice of the peace has attained constitutional recognition and in a certain sense is
one created by the Constitution."
It was further stated that though the appointment of
defendant was unconstitutional and a nullity, his official acts
under such appointment, made under a valid act, were those
' 196 Atl. 409 (Md. 1938).
'"No Senator or Delegate, after qualifying as such, notwithstanding he
may thereafter resign, shall during the whole period of time for which he
was elected be eligible to any office which shall have been created, or the
salary or profits of which shall have been increased during such term."
169 Md. 292, 181 Atl. 735 (1935).
Cf. Levin v. Hewes, 118 Md. 624, 629, 86 Atl. 233, 240 (1912).

